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This review paper identifies and describes the role of clinicians’ memory, emotions and 
physical responses in clinical reasoning processes. Clinical reasoning is complex and multi-
factorial and key models of clinical reasoning within musculoskeletal physiotherapy are 
discussed, highlighting the omission of emotion and subsequent physical responses and how 
these can impact upon a clinician when making a decision.  
 
Discussion 
It is proposed that clinicians should consider the emotions associated with decision-making, 
especially when there is concern surrounding a presentation. Reflecting on practice in the 
clinical environment and subsequently applying this to a patient presentation should involve 
some acknowledgement of clinicians’ physical responses, emotions and how they may play a 
part in any decision made. Presenting intuition and gut-feeling as separate reasoning methods 
and how these processes co-exist with other more accepted reasoning such as hypothetico-
deductive is also discussed. 
 
Conclusion 
Musculoskeletal physiotherapy should consider the elements of feelings, emotions and 
physical responses when applying reflective practice principles. Furthermore, clinicians 
dealing with difficult and challenging presentations should look at the emotional as well as 




















Clinical reasoning is defined in many ways and lacks any single developed framework or 
model from which musculoskeletal clinicians are able to enhance their practice or use as a 
reflective tool in their professional development (Case et al 2000; Edwards et al 2004). The 
process of clinical reasoning is multifarious and clinicians of all levels of ability and 
experience look to develop the cognitive elements of decision-making to enhance practice 
and improve patient-care (Benner 1984; Higgs 1992; Neistadt 1996). This synthesising 
process involves considering many facets of patient data, clinician experience, clinician 
knowledge, and the literature (Higgs and Jones 2008; Simmons 2010). This interactive 
process then further evidences the clinical decision (Childs et al 2003; Curran et al 2006; 
Doody & McAteer 2002; Noll et al 2001; Orme & Maggs 1993). Musculoskeletal 
physiotherapy research has seen common reference to models such as hypothetico-deductive, 
pattern-recognition, narrative reasoning and clinical prediction (Childs et al 2004; Jensen et al 
2000; Jones et al 2008; Mattingly and Fleming 1994).  Models such as these and others have 
described the components of the process of reasoning and explained temporal sequencing, 
however they take little account of the role of emotion and physical responses that the 
clinician may experience when reasoning through a patient presentation.   
  
This theoretical paper makes a case for reconsidering the processes involved in reasoning 
within musculoskeletal physiotherapy which traditionally has employed more analytical 
models. It is proposed that if musculoskeletal physiotherapists do not consider how their own 
emotions and subsequent physical responses influence their clinical reasoning and the 















acumen. It is also proposed that these emotions and physical responses that may influence 
reasoning are an important adjunct to the process of reflective practice. 
 
Methods of reasoning 
Physiotherapy research has conceptualised clinical reasoning in a number of different ways. 
Evaluative work surrounding expertise and novice practice shows similarities between 
professions, especially in common decision-making skills (Curran et al 2006; Hoben et al 
2007; Mattingly 1991). Expert practice in physiotherapy has been proposed to involve a 
combination of knowledge, clinical reasoning, movement and virtues (Jensen et al 2000), 
whilst “master” or expert practice when compared to novice has been shown to be separated 
by the ability to use time, develop frameworks, communicate, teach, and  predict clinical 
outcomes (Jensen et al 1992).  The musculoskeletal physiotherapy literature surrounding 
therapists and reasoning suggests that clinicians commonly may generate initial hypotheses  
and subsequently test them via questioning or physical examination procedures (hypothetico-
deductive) in a deductive way from a general presentation resulting to one that is more 
specific (Jones 1995;1997; Loftus and Smith 2008). They attempt to recognise clinical 
patterns that have been experienced before (pattern-recognition) (Patel et al 1997), clinicians 
may create an understanding of the patient story (narrative reasoning) (Mattingly 1991; 
Mattingly and Fleming 1994) or identify a number of clinical variables that when presented 
together suggest a treatment plan (clinical prediction) (Childs et al 2004). In addition to these 
commonly cited musculoskeletal models there are other less familiar methods of reasoning 
identified such as ethical and procedural: Ethical reasoning requires the knowledge of ethical 
principles, codes of conduct and professional standards and applies these when confronted by 
a clinical dilemma (Barnitt & Partridge 1997; Edwards and Delaney 2008). Ethical reasoning 















surrounding the most appropriate intervention to choose (Clawson 1994). Procedural 
reasoning explores how therapists assess the physical performance of patients’ (such as 
climbing stairs) and then subsequently links this to the integration of home 
adaptation/equipment into the diagnosis and plan (Fleming 1991). The models above suggest 
that musculoskeletal physiotherapy reasoning is commonly a rational analytical process with 
a lack of emphasis on clinician emotion and its possible effects on cognition.  
 
Cognition and emotional markers  
It is recognised that the process of decision-making at a cognitive level has been purported to 
involve stimuli, interpretation, reaction, and evaluation of outcome, whilst acknowledging the 
role of personal experience (Croskerry et al 2009; Ellamil et al 2012; Sailer et al 2007; 
Ullsperger and Von Cramon 2006). Furthermore, this cognitive process is reported to be 
assisted by emotion-related signals, known as emotional/somatic markers (Velasquez 1998). 
Emotional/somatic markers can be described a homeostatic changes that occur in different 
levels of the brain and body in given situations, and link the body to the emotional response 
(Dunn et al 2006). When making decisions an emotional reaction to an option is generated 
and is suggested to create what is known as an emotional/somatic marker which includes 
sensations from the viscera, skeletal and smooth muscles. These markers are suggested to 
serve as an indicator of the value of what is represented, and are linked to the emotional areas 
of the brain thus creating a marker which has physical and emotional components (Bechara & 
Damasio 2005; Damasio et al 1996).  
 
This process is in contrast to economic theory which suggests decisions are devoid of 
emotion and are led by a rule-based approach assessed over a period of time (Kim and Lee 















whilst taking a slower, reasoned approach towards alternatives (Bunge 2004), whereas the 
emotional/somatic marker theory suggests emotions can rapidly guide or bias our decisions 
and may have a supportive role in faster decision-making (Bechara and Damasio 2005; 
Damasio et al 1996).  
 
Some health-related decisions appear stressful and happen quickly, yet these still require 
confidence in an outcome, based on the rapid interpretation of the clinical scenario. For 
example, in an emergency situation, a deliberate rule-based approach may not be appropriate 
as a quick decision is needed as length of time could have a detrimental effect on outcome, 
unlike a decision involved in long-term condition management which can be considered over 
a protracted time period. An example in the musculoskeletal literature of a fast decision 
system are clinical prediction rules which enable the identification of common variables to 
support a decision yet this rule-based system fails to acknowledge clinicians beliefs and 
experiences upon the decision made. Decision-making, whether fast or slow, requires 
interpretation of the information, and the clinician reaction to the consequence of this 
decision may be psychological, emotional, physical, or perhaps all (Krawczyk 2002).  
 
The emotional component that inter-links with the cognitive element of the clinical 
examination is generated by the clinicians’ empathy and the ability to interpret and appreciate 
the patient experience enhancing the patients’ sense of being listened to and understood 
(Mattingly 1991;Orme and Maggs 1993). This clinician and patient relationship has been 
described as intuitive practice (English 1993; Gore & Sadler-Smith 2011; Smith et al 2004) 
and is well documented in nursing literature. A qualitative study that explored the opinions 
and beliefs of nurses’ intuition, suggested that it is an interaction of attributes including: 
















Within musculoskeletal physiotherapy there is a lack of reference towards the role of 
intuition and “gut feeling” which have been noted with greater reference in the nursing and 
medical literature. Intuition has been described as emotional awareness (Strick and 
Dijksterhuis 2011), and “intuitive knowing” (Smith et al 2004), whilst gut-feeling has been 
highlighted as a mechanism for describing unease, and a signal to be more deliberate in 
decision-making for assessing patient cases (Woolley and Kostopoulu 2013). This gap in the 
literature suggests that the cognition required to make a decision may involve clinicians’ 
emotions and subsequent physical reactions such as a stress response, which has been 
demonstrated in other forms of decision-making, as yet this is to be acknowledged in 
musculoskeletal physiotherapy. 
 
Intuitive thought is suggested to be a sub-conscious decision process that is difficult to 
conceptualise but linked to emotion (Hammond 1996), whilst remaining largely invisible  
when attempting to articulate it (Standing 2008). Strick and Dijksterhuis (2011) suggest that 
intuition uses senses, feelings and thoughts to provide a depth of understanding that is linked 
to emotions. A study that explored this further asked 63 participants to analyse information 
regarding the choice of selecting an apartment under different circumstances. One apartment 
was “loaded” to be the more attractive option based on its facilities suggesting this would 
lead to a feeling of that particular apartment being the right choice. The decision accuracy 
was reported to be 36% in the group with time to make a decision, 47% in the group without 
time, yet 59% in the group with time and who were also distracted (Dijksterhuis 2004). This 
result was explained as stemming from a weighting principle that gives less conscious 
thought the ability to link the importance of various attributes in a decision and create a sense 
















The use of emotion has classically differentiated analytical and less rational systems of 
decision-making (Damasio et al 1996), yet there is evidence that emotion and decision-
making are inter-linked and paying attention to our emotions may enhance the process of 
decision-making. Consider why recalling an earlier decision, either perceived as good or bad, 
no matter how long ago it was, can sometimes induce a physical reaction, as a link is made 
back to that marker (emotional memory) and its outcome (Ohira 2010). The clinician, 
reflecting on a difficult/complex decision that led to a significant consequence is able to 
recollect and articulate those feelings when prompted to reflect on the experience. The 
memory linked to clinical reasoning and its relationship to a physical response (such as 
increased heart-rate) is a reaction felt by clinicians (Ohira 2010). The clinician is likely to be 
recalling and reacting to these experiences and whilst this knowledge has been described as 
patterns (Tanner 2006), it is associated patterns linked to the experience from where they 
were developed (i.e. previous clinical scenarios) rather than the current clinical features that 
are presented to the clinician that provide relevance. For example, if a current clinical 
scenario is linked cognitively to a previous successful or unsuccessful intervention for a 
specific clinical presentation then this current pattern would converge with the emotional 
memory that was originally stored, thereby generating a positive or negative emotional 
memory response as part of the pattern recognition process leading to the clinician 
experiencing an emotion. As therapists the importance of understanding  the emotional side 
of the patient experience has been recognised and is considered essential to really gaining a 
better understanding of the patient (Nicholas et al 2011 ), it is therefore reasonable to suggest 
that clinicians should consider the emotional factors in relation to their own experience and 
reasoning processes. Memory and emotions may be relevant and important for clinicians to 
















Physical responses to emotional markers 
It has been suggested that the link between memory, emotion and physical responses such as 
increased sweating, or muscle tone is characterised by “associative construction”. This is the 
reactivation, retrieval and integration of semantic, contextual and sensory components 
(Hassabis and Maguire 2007) such as the interaction with a patient, the integration of clinical 
data and the subsequent emotional or physical reaction to a clinical decision. Studies that 
evaluate this physical process link autonomic reactions to decisions that may have a 
consequence, such as losing at a game of cards.  Critchley (2009) suggests that autonomic 
arousal (physical reaction) results in physical responses (e.g. changes in heart rate/blood 
pressure) occurring via the anticipation/expectation of what might happen as a consequence 
of a decision. One method of evaluating this reaction is via the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), a 
method that simulates decision-making by asking participants to choose cards that may win 
or lose them money (Bechera et al 1994; Northoff et al 2006). This method has shown that 
advantageous decisions are responded to, before the advantageous strategy is known as skin 
conductance responses (SCR) are experienced prior to making a valuable decision (Bechara 
et al 1997), suggesting that there is a sub-conscious sympathetic nervous system reaction to a 
decision, which could be linked to an emotional/somatic marker. In essence, the participants 
were aware of the consequence of a decision autonomically/sub-consciously before they 
verbally offered their response to the decision-making process. 
 
Evidence that these physical, emotional and cognitive elements are linked has been 
demonstrated by Gutbrod et al (2006), in a study using the IGT with participants who had 
experienced damage to the forebrain, resulting in amnesia. The study highlighted that with 















supplement the response. Healthy controls showed anticipatory autonomic responses to a 
poor decision in the game. These findings suggest that associated memory is linked to the 
autonomic nervous system, creating visceral and physical reactions in response to decision-
making. In clinical practice this would suggest that decision-making outcomes will be 
influenced by our physical responses (such as a sensation in the stomach) and these may 
precede the conscious realisation of the decision itself.  What is not known is how these 
physical responses linked to emotion (such as anxiety) directly impact upon the decision-
making process, which is now considered. 
 
The relevance of emotional states upon physical responses and decision-making was 
demonstrated in a study that involved provoking a state of anxiety by asking participants to 
complete a letter based decision task concurrently with an intermittent uncomfortable noise 
(Barrett and Armony 2006). The researchers measured decision accuracy, as a measure of 
cognitive output, and SCR, as a measure of raised autonomic activity. With increased 
anxiety, the SCR was raised, yet the decision speed and accuracy improved, suggesting that 
the autonomic response heightened the cognitive ability of making a decision. It should be 
recognised that these methods of assessing decision-making do not fully reflect the multi-
factorial process of clinical decisions and therefore only provide a linear understanding. 
Autonomic arousal, according to Critchley (2005), is based around the role of anticipation 
feedback, which is then re-enforced with a physiological reaction, such as heart-rate or 
sweating. This could be suggested to enhance learning, as the memory of that decision will 
have a combined and linked physiological and emotional marker. It also suggests that the 
cognitive, autonomic and physical responses create a consciousness of thought which give 
the decision more relevancy as the systems activated here all contribute to confidence in the 















making in certain scenarios. These physiological changes to sub-conscious pressure/anxiety 
and cognitive effort have been described as “gut feelings” (Stolper et al 1996), and are 
suggested to be linked emotionally to stress, dependent on whether the associative memory 
can confirm whether the decision is advantageous (Critchley et al 2001). It is therefore 
possible that gut-feeling/visceral responses may heighten awareness, if the decision is 
believed to affect safety or is seen as especially important. Clinicians may therefore use these 
physical feelings to guide a decision in cases where there is concern, such as a clinical 
presentation of a patient with red flags.  
 
Clinicians perhaps need to take into account the responses in their own visceral and emotive 
systems and how they potentially affect the feelings of right and wrong, and then consider 
testing those responses cognitively to judge relevance in order to make it a more conscious 
retrieval of information informing an explicit decision. This is likely to involve intuition and 
or gut-feeling processes that are best described in terms of cognitive and visceral physical 
responses.  
 
Therefore, when considering how intuition and gut-feeling compare to more analytical 
models of clinical reasoning such as hypothetico-deductive and pattern recognition, it appears 
that a clinician needs to consider their own emotive and physical response components to the 
cognitive process of reasoning. Consider the clinician who had a very negative experience 
with a certain presentation: This could range from a mis-diagnosis, not recognising serious 
pathology, or perhaps ineffective communication with a patient. If a similar scenario were to 
emerge again it could influence the clinician, for example creating hyper-vigilance or anxiety 
that may raise an index of suspicion (Siegert and Taylor 2004). Consider the clinician who 















more sinister. As the clinician reflects, this could create concern and would be “marked” in 
the memory more so than the mechanical low back pain presentation which followed an 
expected clinical trajectory. The clinician, who has success with an assessment and 
interaction involving a specific clinical case, will have the response of confidence the next 
time they engage with a similar clinical presentation. There is little acknowledgement of 
emotion in many clinical reasoning models, yet within decision-making and reflective 
practice perhaps it needs greater representation. 
 
As clinicians working within a bio-psychosocial model of health-care it is perhaps time to 
reflect this on our own clinical decision-making, and accept the bio-psychosocial influence 
on our own decision-making processes. The clinician should acknowledge how their 
reactions, and experiences, when contextualised may affect clinical reasoning in a positive 
way. It is perhaps timely to suggest that a further hypothesis category is needed to represent 
this influence on clinical reasoning to enable clinicians to give credibility to intuitive 



























Clinical reasoning in musculoskeletal physiotherapy has been understood and presented as an 
analytical process, with limited reference to associative emotions and physical responses. 
Hypothetico-deductive, pattern recognition, narrative and clinical prediction models are 
examples of models that do not challenge the clinician to consider their gut-feelings, 
intuitions, emotions, and physical responses to decision-making. Clinicians are expected to 
clinically reason based on the clinical/person centred data, when sometimes these decisions 
provoke fear, concern and a “feeling” that something is not correct within the clinicians 
themselves. The evidence from studies of decision-making highlights that conscious analysis 
is under-pinned by physical and emotional responses, that when used effectively can enhance 
reasoning. Physiotherapy practice could be enhanced in the knowledge that some decisions 
are influenced by clinicians emotions and physical reactions associated with the decision-
making process. These emotions potentially are linked to personal, clinical, and life 
experiences of the clinician, therefore it is the task of the clinician to then delve deeper into 
their reasoning to explore these and how they influence their clinical practice.  Armed with 
the research presented here, the authors challenge physiotherapists to identify their own 
emotions, fears and beliefs when formulating their clinical decisions, and consider the impact 
of those feelings when exploring the process of reflective practice. When considering a 
clinical presentation the clinician should be reactive to the less analytical methods of 




















Barnitt R, Partridge C.  Ethical reasoning in physical therapy and occupational therapy.  
Physiotherapy Research International 1997; 2 (3): 178-192. 
Barrett J, Armony JL. The influence of trait anxiety on autonomic response and cognitive 
performance during an anticipatory anxiety task. Depress.Anxiety 2006; 23 (4): 210-219. 
Bechara A, Damasio AR, Damasio H, Anderson SW. Insensitivity to future consequences 
following damage to human pre-frontal cortex. Cognition 1994; 50:7-15. 
Bechara A, Damasio H, Tranel D,  Damasio A R. Deciding Advantageously Before Knowing 
the Advantageous Strategy. Science 1997; 275 (5304): 1293-1295. 
Bechara A, Damasio AR. The somatic marker hypothesis: A neural theory of economic 
decision. Games and Economic Behaviour 2005; 52 (2): 336-372. 
Benner P. From novice to expert: Excellence and power in clinical nursing practice. 1984; 
Reading MA: Addison-Wesley. 
Bunge S. How we use rules to select actions: A review of evidence from cognitive 
neuroscience. Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioural Neuroscience 2004; 4 (4): 564-579. 
Case K, Harrison K, Roskell C. Differences in the clinical reasoning of expert and novice 
cardiorespiratory physiotherapists. Physiotherapy 2000; 86 (1): 14-21. 
Childs JD, Fritz JM, Piva SR, Erhard RE. Clinical decision making in the identification of 
patients likely to benefit from spinal manipulation: a traditional versus an evidence-based 















Childs JD, Fritz JM, Flynn TW, Irrgang JJ, Johnson KK, Majkowski GR, Delitto AA. 
Clinical prediction rule to identify patients with low back pain most likely to benefit from 
spinal manipulation: a validation study. Ann.Intern.Med 2004; 141 (12): 920-928. 
Clawson AL. The relationship between clinical decision-making and ethical decision making. 
Physiotherapy 1994; 80 (1): 10-14. 
Croskerry, P. Clinical cognition and diagnostic error: applications of a dual process model of 
reasoning. Advances in Health Sciences Education. 2009; 14 (1): 27-35. 
Critchley HD. Psychophysiology of neural, cognitive and affective integration: fMRI and 
autonomic indicants. Int.J.Psychophysiol 2009; 73 (2): 88-94. 
Critchley HD, Mathias CJ, Dolan RJ. Neural activity in the human brain relating to 
uncertainty and arousal during anticipation. Neuron 2001; 29 (2): 537-545. 
Critchley HD. Neural mechanisms of autonomic, affective, and cognitive integration", 
J.Comp Neurol 2005; 493 (1): 154-166. 
Curran MJ, Campbell J, Rugg G.  An investigation into the clinical reasoning of both expert 
and novice podiatrists. The Foot 2006; 16 (1): 28-32.  
Damasio AR, Everitt BJ, Bishop D. The Somatic Marker Hypothesis and the Possible 
Functions of the Prefrontal Cortex. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of 
London. Series B: Biological Sciences 1996; 351(1346): 1413-1420. 
Dijksterhuis A. Think different: The methods of unconscious thought in preference 
















Doody C, McAteer M. Clinical reasoning of expert and novice physiotherapists in an 
outpatient setting. Physiotherapy 2002; 88 (5): 258-268. 
Dunn BD, Dalgleish T, Lawrence AD. The somatic marker hypothesis: A critical evaluation. 
Neurosci and Biobehavourial Reviews 2006; 30: 239-271. 
Edwards I, Jones M, Carr J, Braunack-Mayer A, Jensen GM.  Clinical reasoning strategies in 
physical therapy. Physical Therapy.2004; 84 (4): 312-330. 
Edwards I, and Delany, C. (2008) Ethical reasoning. IN: Clinical reasoning in the health 
professions. (3rd Edition) London: Elsevier: 279-290. 
Ellamil M, Dobson C, Beeman M, Christof, K. Evaluative and generative modes of thought 
during the creative process. Neuroimage 2012; 59 (2): 1783-1794. 
English, I. Intuition as a function of the expert nurse: a critique of Benners novice to expert 
model. Journal of Adv Nursing 1993; 18: 387-393. 
Fleming, MH. Clinical reasoning in medicine compared with clinical reasoning in 
occupational therapy  Am.J.Occup.Ther 1991; 45 (11): 988-996. 
Gore J, Sadler-Smith, E. Unpacking intuition: A process and outcome framework. Review of 
General Psychology 2011; 15 (4): 304-316. 
Gutbrod K, Krouzel C, Hofer H, Muri R, Perrig W, Ptak R. Decision-making in amnesia: do 
advantageous decisions require conscious knowledge of previous behavioural choices? 
Neuropsychologia 2006; 44 (8): 1315-1324. 
Hammond KR. Human judgment and social policy: Irreducible uncertainty, inevitable error, 















Hassabis D, Maguire EA. Deconstructing episodic memory with construction. Trends Cogn 
Sci 2007; 11 (7): 299-306. 
Higgs J. Developing clinical reasoning competencies. Physiotherapy. 78 (8): 575-581. 
Higgs J, Jones MA. Clinical decision making and multiple problem spaces. IN: Clinical 
reasoning in the health professions. 3rd Edition, London: Elsevier; 2008. 3-18. 
Hoben K, Varley R, Cox R. Clinical reasoning skills of speech and language therapy 
students.  Int.J.Lang Commun.Disord 2007; 42 Suppl (1): 123-135. 
Jensen GM, Shepard, KF, Gwyer J, Hack LM. Attribute dimensions that distinguish mater 
and novive physical therapy clinicians in orthopaedic settings. Physical Therapy 1992; 72 
(10): 711-722. 
Jensen GM, Gwyer J, Shepard KF, Hack LM. Expert Practice in Physical Therapy. Physical 
Therapy 2000; 80 (1): 28-43. 
Jones MA.Clinical reasoning and pain. Man.Ther; 1995 1 (1): 17-24. 
 
Jones MA, Clinical reasoning: the foundation of clinical practice. Part 1. Aust.J.Physiother; 
1997 43 (3): 167-170. 
 
Jones MA, Jensen G, Edwards I. (2008) Clinical reasoning in physiotherapy. IN: Clinical 
reasoning in the health professions. 3rd Edition, London: Elsevier. 245-256. 
Krawczyk DC. Contributions of the prefrontal cortex to the neural basis of human decision 
making, Neuroscience and Biobehavourial Reviews 2002; 26 (6): 631-664. 
















Loftus S, Smith M. (2008) A history of clinical reasoning. IN: Clinical reasoning in the health 
professions. (3rd edition) London: Elsevier: 2008. 205-212. 
Mattingly C.  The narrative nature of clinical reasoning. Am J Occup Ther 1991; 45: 998-
1005. 
Mattingly C, Fleming MH. Clinical reasoning: Forms of inquiry in a therapeutic practice. FA 
Davis: Philadelphia. 1994. 
McCutcheon HHI, Pincombe J. Intuition: an important tool in the practice of nursing, Journal 
of Advanced Nursing 2001; 35 (3):342-348. 
Neistadt M. Teaching strategies for the development of clinical reasoning. Am J Occup Ther 
1996; 50: 676-684.  
Nicholas MK, Linton SJ, Watson PJ, Main CJ. Early identification and management of 
psychological risk factors (“yellow flags”) in patients with low back pain: a reappraisal. Phys 
Ther 2011; 91 (5): 1-17. 
 
Noll E, Key A, Jensen G. Clinical reasoning of an experienced physiotherapist: insight into 
clinician decision-making regarding low back pain. Physiother.Res.In 2001; 6: 40-51. 
 
Northoff G, Grimm S, Boeker H, Schmidt C, Bermpohl F, Heinzel A, Hell D, Boesiger P. 
Affective judgment and beneficial decision making: ventromedial prefrontal activity 

















Ohira H. The Somatic Marker Revisited: Brain and Body in Emotional Decision Making. 
Emotion Review 2010; 2 (3): 245-249. 
 
Orme L, and Maggs C. Decision-making in clinical practice: how do expert nurses, midwives 
and health visitors make decisions? Nurse Education Today 1993; 13(4): 270-276. 
Patel V, Groen G, Patel Y. Cognitive aspects of clinical performance during patient workup: 
The role of medical expertise. Advances in Health Sciences Education 1997; 2: 95-114. 
Sailer U, Robinson S, Fischmeister FP, Moser E, Kryspin-Exner I,  Bauer H. Imaging the 
changing role of feedback during learning in decision-making. NeuroImage 2007; 37(4): 
1474-1486. 
Siegert R and Taylor WJ. Theoretical aspects of goal-setting and motivation in rehabilitation. 
Disability and rehabilitation 2004; 26 (1): 1-8. 
Simmons B. Clinical reasoning: Concept analysis. Journal of advanced Nursing 2010; 66 (5): 
1151. 
Smith AJ, Thurkettle, MA, and Cruz FA. Use of intuition by nursing students: instrument 
development and testing. Journal of Advanced Nursing 2004; 47 (6): 614-622. 
Standing M. Clinical judgement and decision-making in nursing - nine modes of practice in a 
revised cognitive continuum. J Adv.Nurs 2008; 62 (1): 124-134. 
Strick M, and Dijkstrerhuis A. Intuition and unconscious thought: Handbook of intuition 















Stolper E, van Royen P, Dinant GJ. The 'sense of alarm' ('gut 
feeling') in clinical practice. A survey among European general practitioners on recognition 
and expression. Acute renal infections. Radiol Clin North Am 1996; 34(5): 965-995. 
Tanner C. thinking like a nurse: A research-based model of clinical judgement in Nursing. 
Journal of Nursing Education.2006; 45 (6): 204-211. 
Ullsperger M and von Cramon DY. The role of intact frontostriatal circuits in error 
processing.  J.Cogn Neurosci 2006; 18 (4): 651-664. 
Velasquez JD. When robots weep: Emotional memories and decision-making. Presented at 
Fifteenth national conference on artificial intelligence, Madison, WI. 1998. 
Woolley A, Kostopoulou O. Clinical intuition in family medicine: More than first 
impressions. Annals of family medicine 2013; 11(1): 60-66. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
